EFFECTIVENESS OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT IN EU COUNTRIES ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSIONS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51547/ppp.dp.ua/2023.2.7Keywords:
committee of inquiry, parliamentary inquiry, parliamentary controlAbstract
The article analyzes the practice of applying the Institute of Investigative Commissions in the EU countries and determines the role of this institution in the process of parliamentary control over the activities of the government. The main aspects of parliamentary control of the government in the countries of the European Union are identified. The forms of parliamentary control and their features are classified. The organizational and legal bases of activity and practical aspects of the functioning of Investigative Commissions in the EU are analyzed. It is proved that the effective mechanism of parliamentary control is Investigative Commissions, which are bodies of the parliament or one of its chambers, created for the purpose of establishing the facts of inefficient public administration, exposing abuses of state authorities and having special powers close to judicial and administrative ones. The concept of the investigative commission of the Parliament reveals the following elements: 1) is an internal body of the parliament; 2) has the authority to conduct an investigation; 3) the purpose of the activity is to study the actual and legal status of the problem outlined by the parliament and the formulation of the relevant decision; 4) to implement its own goal, it has power over the subjects of the executive power controlled by the parliament, in particular individuals, to obtain information; 5) the results of the commission's work are the basis for the parliament to make a decision within the limits of its powers. The commission's report may result in bringing officials to constitutional or political responsibility, as well as sending the case to law enforcement agencies. The report performs a purely advisory function and is not binding on the parliament, the government, or the judiciary. It provides results of the activities of the investigating body, which may be useful for further solving the problem by the competent authorities. In order for these recommendations to be implemented, they must be supported by a parliamentary majority
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